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Determining the conditions that lead to the formation of radical Islamist groups 
will help analysts and policy-makers prioritize countries within sub-Saharan Africa that 
may need monitoring to prevent the onset of indigenous terrorism.  This thesis attempts 
to produce knowledge toward that end by determining causal variables hypothesized to 
be associated with radical Islamist group formation through inductive analysis.  A 
narrative describing the formation of a radical Islamist movement in Kano, Nigeria is 
compared against a narrative describing the conditions in Zanzibar City, Tanzania, where 
radical groups have not formed. The goal of the thesis is to generate an initial 
understanding of the underlying conditions that cause radical group formation to help 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since September 11th, 2001 the United States, under the auspices of the Global 
War on Terrorism, has sought to find and dismantle any terrorist-related organizations 
that may pose a threat to its national security interests.  Attention remains rightly centered 
on the Al-Qaida network and its affiliates, which pose the most serious threat to U.S. 
national security.  Given that Al-Qaida associates are primarily from Middle Eastern 
countries, little attention is paid to the potential for a similar type of radical Islamist 
movement to form within Sub-Saharan Africa.  This is not to say, however, that the U.S. 
is completely ignoring the continent.  U.S. policy-makers are currently using the 
assumption that failed states are breeding grounds for terrorism to formulate Africa 
policy aimed at eliminating the underlying conditions that cause groups to emerge.1  The 
2002 National Security Strategy of the United States asserts that “America is now 
threatened less by conquering states, than we are by failing ones.”2  Assistant Secretary 
of State for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner testified before Congress about the threat 
of the failed state in Somalia: “What better place for the seeds of international terrorism 
and lawlessness to take root?”3  A similar assertion is made by Dr. Susan Rice, who 
previously held Kansteiner’s job, in her testimony before Congress: “…we must 
recognize that regimes lacking legitimacy and failed states are convenient safe havens as 
well as breeding grounds for terrorists.”4  While this explanation seems logical, the 
empirical evidence suggests that failed states are in fact no more likely to generate radical 
                                                
1 Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 
(Summer 2002): 85. 
2 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, 1. 
3 Walter H. Kansteiner III, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
Subcommittee on African Affairs, Washington, DC, 6 February 2002. Available [Online]: 
http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/7872.htm [12 December 2003]. 
4 Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Africa and the War on Global Terrorism: 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, 107th Cong., 1st 
sess., 15 November 2001, 8. 
2 
movements than non-failed states.5  Therefore, a closer examination of the conditions that 
lead to the emergence of radical groups is needed. 
In order to study terrorist groups, researchers must identify whether they are 
interested in communist groups, socialist groups, right-wing groups, or a variety of other 
ideologically driven radicals.  This thesis will focus on the conditions surrounding the 
emergence of the movements that pose the greatest threat to the United States today: 
radical Islamists.  It must be stated that not all Islamic beliefs lead to radicalism.  There 
are different kinds of ideologies that can be identified with Islamism, and for this reason, 
definitions need to be provided to ensure the reader is clear as to which belief is covered 
by this thesis and why.  Islamist movements can be defined as “political opposition 
movements,” and sub-divided into three categories:  religious, reformist, and radical.6 
• Religious: Groups that reject state-sponsored Islam, and prefer a non-
violent, grassroots approach to making society more Islamic, usually 
through religious education.  
• Reformist: Groups that call for direct political action, using democratic or 
electoral processes to achieve a non-violent transfer of power.  
• Radical:  Groups that want to achieve quick changes in power and 
establish shari’a (Islamic Law), through any means necessary to include 
terrorist acts.7 
This thesis examines the latter category, since it is the only one associated with the use of 
terrorism.  Of the 74 terrorist groups identified in Patterns of Terrorism 2002, 37 have 
Islamist roots.8  The remaining groups do not fall into similarly distinct subcategories. 
Many lack any ideological platform beyond opposition to an incumbent government, and 
are defined as terrorist solely on the basis of their targeting of civilians.9  Thus, these 
                                                
5 Rotberg lists eight failed states in the world, of these, only Somalia has actually “bred” a radical 
Islamist movement, the Al-Ittihad Al-Islami.  Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, and Weak States: 
Causes and Indicators” in State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 10. 
6 John P. Entelis, “Political Islam in the Maghreb” in Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa, 
ed. John P. Entelis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 44-45. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, (Washington D.C.: Department of State 
Publication, April 2003), 99-146. 
9 For example, many of the terrorist organizations identified in Africa are not necessarily terrorist 
movements, but are rebel movements that employ terrorist tactics.  Such an example of this is the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. 
3 
groups pose little if any threat to the United States or its interests.  At the same time, 
every major terrorist attack against the United States in the past 10 years, with the 
exception of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 2000 Olympic Park bombing, has 
been associated with radical Islamist ideology.10  In particular, the attack of September 
11th, 2001 by radical Islamists resulted in the greatest number of deaths from any single 
terrorist act in U.S. history. 
Security reasons aside, radical movements are of more interest to this analysis 
than religious or reformist movements because the latter two generally do not advocate 
violence.  For example, there are no known cases of an existing religious Islamist 
movement deciding to modify its charter and transform itself into a radical group, 
although religious movements sometimes do aid radical movements by means of 
religious and ideological indoctrination in addition to financial support.  Non-
Governmental Organizations, such as Al-Haramain, have been identified as supporters of 
radical Islamist movements such as Al-Qaida and Al-Ittihad Al-Islami through funding 
and other means.11  However, Islamist NGOs do not actively run radical movements in 
their own names.  While reformist movements do sometimes produce radical splinter 
groups, it is better to think of these as new movements in and of themselves.  Generally, 
they operate independently from the parent organizations and claim terrorist acts in their 
own names.   
For example, it is often cited that the Algerian Islamist reformist group Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS) radicalized after the Algerian military nullified its electoral victory 
in 1992.  However, the new group really was a separate, “unofficial armed wing” of the 
FIS, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), taking on a radical mission.12  Furthermore, the 
AIS did not perpetrate violence in name of the FIS, but rather in its own name. Thus, the 
AIS and other such radical splinter groups will be considered independent radical  
 
                                                
10 These attacks comprise the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, 
1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, U.S.S. Cole attack in 2000, and World Trade 
Center/Pentagon attacks September 2001. 
11 Department of Treasury, Fact Sheet: Designations of Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina Branches of 
Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, 11 March 2002. [Available Online]: 
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02031104.htm [23 October 2003]. 
12 Ibid., 64. 
4 
movements.  For all of these aforementioned reasons, this thesis deals with radical 
Islamist movements exclusively, rather than terrorist movements or Islamist groups in 
general.   
Most of the literature regarding radical Islamism is focused on the Middle East 
and North Africa.  A wide variety of perspectives on the sources of radicalism emerge 
from a review of that literature.  Stephen C. Pelletiere’s study of radical Islamist 
movements in Algeria, Egypt, and the Palestinian territories led him to conclude that 
radicalized movements began as moderate reform movements.13  Indeed, when studying 
some of the more well-known Islamist movements in Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia for 
example, one sees that such movements are led by relatively well-educated people from 
urban areas, who are dissatisfied with the government for one reason or another.14  
Generally, such leaders try to engage the lower middle-class and university students to 
rally to their cause. 
Others focus on absolute and relative levels of deprivation.  For example, Mark 
Tessler argues that Islamic movements prosper in situations where “the supply of jobs, 
education, and housing has been unable to keep pace with demand,” because this results 
in disenfranchised individuals, who are then more likely to support Islamist 
organizations.15  In addition to such absolute deprivation, Tessler also points to a sense of 
relative deprivation as an indicator of potential support for Islamist groups.  These 
fundamentalist Islamist groups are relatively successful in recruiting followers in areas 
where the government is failing to meet the needs of a select group of people (whether it 
be for ethnic, religious, or other reasons) in terms of jobs and social services.   
Max Taylor and John Horgan, writing from a psychological perspective, argue 
that the fundamentalist will translate his beliefs into behavior because he believes in the 
                                                
13 Stephen Pelletiere, A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into the Origin and Development of 
the Movement, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College), 1995, 2. 
14 See Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, Trans. By Anthony F. Roberts, (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 2002 and Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics 
of Dissent,  (New York: Palgrave), 1999. 
15 Mark Tessler, “The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements” in Islam, Democracy, and 
the State in North Africa, ed. John P. Entelis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 96. 
5 
truth of his religious prescriptions for society.16  Thus radical behavior is a necessary 
measure for Islamists, because it allows them to ease the feeling of discontent (in their 
terms, cognitive dissonance) caused by the disconnect between internal and external 
factors.  In an example of this type of explanation, Nazih Ayubi suggests that Muslims in 
Egypt turned to Islamic organizations out of socioeconomic frustration.17  More 
specifically, Ayubi argues that alternative secular organizations are considered to be 
“imported and alien” while other political outlets of expression are banned.   
Despite a variety of theoretical perspectives, none of these explanations have been 
systematically tested against the history of radical Islam in the Arab world.  Their 
applicability outside the Arab world is even more uncertain.  This thesis seeks to identify 
specific conditions under which radical Islamist movements form in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Since part of the U.S. strategy for combating terrorism involves “diminishing the 
underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit,” the findings of this thesis should 
also contribute to refining antiterrorism policy in Sub-Saharan Africa.18 
This thesis uses an inductive approach to identify conditions under which radical 
Islamists groups form, using case studies of Nigeria and Tanzania.  Nigeria has been 
home to radical Islamist groups since at least the 1970s.  Despite its many similarities to 
Nigeria (e.g., a long history of interaction with Islam, substantial Muslim populations, 
and similar political, economic, and social conditions), Tanzania has yet to generate any 
radical Islamist groups.  The case studies employed in this thesis seek to identify critical 
factors that might explain these different outcomes.  Chapter II will concentrate 
specifically on northern Nigeria and its history of radical Islamist movement formation.  
Chapter III concentrates specifically on Zanzibar (in Tanzania) to determine why radical 
groups are not forming there despite structural conditions similar to those found in 
Nigeria.  Chapter IV will conclude by offering a theoretical explanation of radical group 
formation based on the findings of the case studies. The chapter also offers 
recommendations for refining U.S. efforts to combat terrorism in Africa. 
                                                
16 Max Taylor and John Horgan, “The Psychological and Behavioural Bases of Islamic 
Fundamentalism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 37. 
17 Nazih Ayubi, “The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt,” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 12, no. 4 (December 1980): 495. 
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7 
II. RADICAL ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN NIGERIA 
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, and has the potential to become a 
hegemon in West Africa.  Nigeria’s porous borders, combined with the government’s 
weak policing capability, make the country a possible staging point for future terrorist 
activities throughout the region.19  Currently, there are at least two radical Islamist groups 
active in Nigeria: the Islamic Movement and the Movement for Islamic Revival.  In the 
past, there have also been other radical groups, such as the 1970s Maitatsine movement 
and the 1980s Izala movement under Sheikh Isma’il Idris.  This chapter focuses on the 
Maitatsine, because it is the best-documented group.   
Nigeria has a turbulent history, marred by periods of political, ethnic, and 
religious violence.  These tensions still exist within the state today, and their roots can be 
traced back to the colonial period of the nineteenth century.  In many ways, Nigeria’s 
current problems have been problematic for over two hundred years.  While this chapter 
is more concerned with finding the causes of radical Islamism, a general history of 
Nigeria will be provided to place the reader in the proper context. 
Perhaps the best place to begin a history of the state as a whole is with British 
colonialism.  Initial European interaction in pre-colonial Nigeria occurred primarily along 
the coast in the southern regions through slave traders and missionaries.  The slave trade 
exacerbated ethnic differences, as Africans tended to enslave other Africans for profit.  In 
particular, the Oyo Yoruba kingdom of western Nigeria in the 17th and 18th Century, 
followed by the Sokoto Caliphate of Hausa in northern Nigeria in the 19th Century, 
tended to provide slaves to European traders and other Africans respectively.20  Of the 
slaves taken in the 18th Century from the region, over half appear to have been Igbo in 
                                                
19 Peter M. Lewis, “Islam, Protest, and Conflict in Nigeria,” Africa Notes 10, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (December 2002): 3.  Available [Online]: 
www.csis.org/africa/ANotes/ANotes0212.pdf [8 December 2003]. 
20 Robin Law, “A West African Cavalry State: The Kingdom of Oyo,” The Journal of African History 
16, no. 1 (1975): 10 and David C. Tambo, “The Sokoto Caliphate Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century,” 
The International Journal of African Historical Studies 9, no. 2 (1976): 203-205. 
8 
origin.21  These three ethnic groups, Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo, still make up the majority 
of Nigerians today, and they remain in the same geographical areas of the state.   
The advent of British colonialism in the 19th Century eventually brought the slave 
trade to a close in Nigeria as palm oil became the sought-after commodity by European 
for use in soap and candles.22  In the quest to exploit the country for its palm oil 
resources, the British utilized ethnic divisions to administer governance.  Using a system 
of indirect rule, the British let each region run itself under native authorities appointed by 
colonial administrators.  The Hausa in the north continued to use the system of Islamic 
rule that had existed since the early 1800s while the Yoruba in the west had previous 
experience in government through their kingdoms.  These preexisting indigenous 
institutions facilitated the building of British colonial administrations in the northern and 
western regions of the territory.  In the east however, the British had to implement a 
system of warrant chiefs because no pre-existing form of centralized government existed 
within the Igbo communities.23  Irrespective of the colonial administrative structures used 
in Nigeria, in all areas of the territory the overall system of indirect rule served to 
empower some natives (such as warrant chiefs), while taking away power from others 
(those who refused to cooperate with the British).  This legacy of indirect rule found its 
way into the Nigerian federal system established at independence in 1960, thereby 
translating ethnic differences into political differences that would help pave the way for 
future radical Islamic movements in Nigeria. 
The First Republic in Nigeria reinforced the system precedent of dividing the 
country along primarily ethnic lines.  The republic itself was built along the lines of 
indirect rule, similar to the British method during the colonial period.  The British 
initiated, through Nigerian representatives, the establishment of three federated regions 
under the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954.  This federated structure of government 
continued with the Independence Constitution of 1960 and into the official establishment 
                                                
21 David Northrup, “The Growth of Trade Among the Igbo Before 1800,” The Journal of African 
History 13, no. 2 (1972): 232.  
22 Patrick Manning, “Slaves, Palm Oil, and Political Power on the West African Coast,” African 
Historical Studies 2, no. 2 (1969): 280. 
23 P.C. Lloyd, “The Ethnic Background to the Nigerian Crisis,” in Nigerian Politics and Military Rule, 
ed. S.K. Panter-Brick, (London: The Athlone Press, University of London, 1970), 4. 
9 
of the First Republic in 1963.24  The regions coincided with each of the three major 
ethnic groups.25  Each regional government had control over agriculture, education, 
health, and local government allowing for a large degree of autonomy.  The federal 
government, located in Lagos, had control over defense, police, and foreign policy in 
addition to communications and transportation.  Economics and education was a shared 
burden between the federal and regional governments.  The Nigerian political system, 
however, relied heavily on the patronage system, whereby resources were distributed 
based on access to power.  This access was obtained through political parties, which 
began as early in the 1940s and evolved through the 1950s.  Political parties developed 
primarily along ethnic lines, as political elites reached out to their own communities for 
support.  The Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) represented primarily Muslim Hausa 
constituents from the Northern Region; the Action Group (AG) represented primarily 
Christian Yoruba from the Western Region; and the National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroons (NCPC) primarily represented Igbo from the Eastern Region.26  Thus 
ethnicity and religion became intermixed with politics, resulting over time in violence 
rooted in all three.  As a result, Nigeria remains a conglomeration of different political 
identities that are usually divided primarily along ethnic lines.   
Nigeria’s religious differences, much like its political differences, are largely a 
result of different influences over its history.  European missionaries who arrived in the 
southern parts of Nigeria largely converted the southern communities, including most of 
the Igbo, and nearly half of the Yoruba.  The missionaries established Anglican schools 
that helped educate the children of the south, while those of the north had no similar level 
of education available.  This in turn led the south to garner more resources than the north 
through the colonial period by being available to take on more administrative jobs.  
Additionally, once independence was achieved, most of the civil service jobs went to 
those in the south who were educated.  Therefore, the largely Christian south was 
economically and socially advantaged as compared to the Islamic north.  As a result, 
clashes occurred between Muslims and Christians over the years, though it is difficult to 
                                                
24 A. Oyewole, Historical Dictionary of Nigeria (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1987), 87-88.  
25 Brian Smith, “Federal-State Relations in Nigeria,” African Affairs 80, no. 320 (1981): 356. 
26 Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963),  474-512. 
10 
say whether religion or an expression of socioeconomic frustration was the primary 
source of friction.  Despite these religious differences on a national level, the formation 
of radical Islamist movements in Nigeria did not spring from an anti-Christian platform, 
but one that was focused on reform at the local level.  The implementation of shari’a in 
the north 2000, where most of the country’s 55 million Muslims reside, threatens to 
further exacerbate a longstanding division within Nigeria along religious lines.27   
The focus of this chapter will be narrowed to the city of Kano in northern Nigeria 
in an attempt to understand why a radical Islamist movement formed in that city.  It is 
first necessary, however, to sketch the history of Islam in Nigeria. 
 
A. THE ADVENT OF ISLAM IN NIGERIA 
Islam first entered Hausaland (the northern areas of modern-day Nigeria) as early 
as 1385 A.D.28 There are written texts from the time period that report the coming of the 
Wangarawa, a group of Muslim gold merchants who sought to expand trade links 
throughout West Africa.29  The Wangarawa brought with them the teachings of the 
Qur’an and are attributed with leading the first Hausa converts to Islam.  Although 
conversion was driven, at least in part, by local traders' interest in obtaining lines of credit 
from the Muslims, the basics of the religion were transferred at that time.30  
Islam appears to have been introduced piecemeal into the region as evidenced by 
the Kano Chronicle, which details the history of the area.  It records that until the mid-
15th Century, the Qur’an, ‘ilm al-figh (jurisprudence), and the hadith (sayings of the 
Prophet Muhammad) were the only sources of knowledge of Islam.  Missionaries from 
Mali then brought the “disciplines of tawhid (unity of God) and grammar.”31  Additional 
                                                
27 “New Sharia Law in Nigeria,” BBC News Online, 28 Apr 2004. 
28 Mervyn Hiskett, The Development of Islam in West Africa, (London: Longman, 1984),  74. 
29 Ibid. 
30Jean Ensminger, Making a Market: The Institutional Transformation of an African Society, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 59-62. Ensminger shows how conversion to Islam 
among the Orma tribe in Kenya between 1920-1940 had a direct impact on transaction costs for local 
merchants by establishing lines of credit based on trust, which is key when trading in commodities such as 
cattle that may not instantly yield cash profits. 
31Cited in J. Spencer Trimingham, A History of Islam in West Africa, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1962), 132. 
11 
clerics introduced other customs and wrote discourses on Islamic issues over the next few 
hundred years, but a true push for Islam did not come until the advent of the Fulani Jihad 
of 1804-1808, led by Usamanu dan Fodio.  
Dan Fodio was a Fulani preacher who aimed to bring Islamic reform to Hausaland 
between the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.  Specifically, dan Fodio 
entered the court of the Sarkin of Gobir, Bawa Jangworzo in 1781, possibly to tutor the 
royal family, but also in an effort to convert the Sultan from animism to Islam.32  Though 
Bawa was cordial to dan Fodio, he did so hoping to keep peace with the mallams (Islamic 
scholars).  Dan Fodio did not promote a radical message during the reign of Bawa (which 
ended in 1791), but nonetheless through his preaching gathered followers throughout the 
community.  Dan Fodio believed that the world was divided between two types of people, 
the Muslim and the non-Muslim.  Additionally, he promoted a belief in only two types of 
government, the one of the infidel, and the one of the Muslim.  He believed that if a 
Muslim ruled, then the country was predisposed to be just.  In the absence of a Muslim 
ruler, the country was one of infidels.33  Additionally, any ruler who called himself a 
Muslim had to practice shari’a to perfection, or he could not be considered a true 
Muslim.  Since the rulers of the day in Hausaland embraced animism in addition to 
Islamic practices, dan Fodio did not believe they were Muslims, and therefore, he 
considered their policies to be anti-Islamic. 
Dan Fodio attracted a wide variety of believers with his preaching, primarily 
because there were many people at the time who were dissatisfied with the government of 
the sarkuna (Hausa rulers).  Some of the groups dan Fodio appealed to were the orthodox 
mallams, the Fulani pastoralists (Bararoji), the Hausa peasantry, and (to a lesser extent) 
the Fulani city-dwellers (Fulanin Gidda).34  Islamic scholars were attracted to dan Fodio 
because of a shared belief that the Hausa rulers were unjust because they were not 
Muslim.  The Fulani pastoralists were attracted to dan Fodio’s criticism of the sarkuna 
for economic and social reasons.  Since the Bararoji were primarily cattle-herders, they 
                                                
32 Marilyn Robinson Waldman, “The Fulani Jihad: A Reassessment,” The Journal of African History 
6, no. 3 (1965): 340. 
33 H.R. Palmer, “An Early Fulani Conception of Jihad,” Journal of the Royal African Society 13, no. 
52 (July 1914): 407. 
34 Waldman., 342. 
12 
depended on having grazing land to feed their flock.  The Hausa taxed the Fulani for each 
head of cattle, and tried to justify it through the Qur’an by inappropriately associating the 
tax with the same that is paid by non-Muslims to Muslim rulers.35  Economic reasons 
also seemed to be at the root of dan Fodio’s popularity among the Hausa peasantry.  The 
Hausa rulers taxed the peasantry indiscriminately and harshly, leaving the peasants 
feeling discontented.  Dan Fodio’s criticism of the taxes based on Islamic justification 
resonated with the peasantry since it addressed one of their grievances with the 
government.36   
A final group that supported dan Fodio (albeit to a lesser extent) was the wealthy 
Fulanin Gidda.  The Gidda were concerned more with gaining political power than with 
existing economic disparities.  Although the sarkuna appointed the Gidda as rulers over 
the Fulani, the Gidda were not considered to be on an equal basis with the Hausa rulers, 
nor could they ascend to the throne based on their ethnic background.37  Dan Fodio’s 
message resonated with the Gidda because he eventually proposed a toppling of the 
Hausa governments, thereby providing a way for the Gidda to gain political power.  
During the time of Sarkin Barwa, dan Fodio had unfettered access to preach to not 
only the ruler, but to the people as well.  Each of Barwa’s successors (Yakubu, Nafata, 
and Yunfa) paid homage to dan Fodio, but none of them officially sanctioned his 
sermons.  Sarkin Yunfa made the most concerted effort at eliminating Islam, which 
directly led to the jihad.  Yunfa decided to threaten the use of force against dan Fodio and 
his followers in an effort to destroy the movement in 1803.  A particular turning point 
came that year when, as a result of Yunfa’s threats, some of dan Fodio’s followers fled to 
the town of Gimbana and fortified it against attack.38  Dan Fodio was called to the court 
at Gobir from Degel in an effort to force him to end the standoff over Gimbana.  At some 
point after his return to the court, Yunfa decided to try to kill dan Fodio, but the sarkin’s 
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38 F. Daniel, “Shehu dan Fodio,” Journal of the Royal African Society 25, no. 99 (April 1926): 280. 
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gun backfired.  Afterward, Yunfa told dan Fodio how much he hated him, but allowed 
him to leave the court nonetheless.  Yunfa’s undoing came when he decided to take the 
town of Gimbana by force.  His army killed many Muslims and took others captive, but 
on their march back to Gobir, they passed dan Fodio’s home in Degel.  Although it is 
unclear whether dan Fodio made a deal with the sarkin or simply convinced the army to 
let the captives go, the Muslims were set free in Degel under the condition that they 
would return to Gobir with dan Fodio. 
Given the hostile nature of Yunfa at the time, it is no surprise that dan Fodio did 
not return to Gobir with his followers.  Yunfa subsequently threatened to destroy Degel 
just as he did Gimbana, which caused dan Fodio and his followers to flee to the town of 
Gudu in February 1804.39  Dan Fodio labeled this escape as a hijra, made reference to 
Muhammad’s flight to Medina to gather strength prior to the onset of jihad against 
Mecca.  This event was the true turning point for dan Fodio, as he began to write more 
earnestly of the need to replace the infidel rulers with just rulers through force.  When 
further negotiations between himself and Yunfa failed, dan Fodio was elected to be the 
Sarkin Musulmi, the equivalent of what in Arabic is known as the Amir-ul-mulminina, or 
Commander of the Faithful.40  He thus became the leader of a movement whose goal was 
to overthrow the existing government through force, and replace it with an Islamic state 
under shari’a law—the Fulani Jihad.  Thus, the first radical Islamist movement in Nigeria 
was born. 
The Fulani Jihad came to an end in 1808, having achieved many of its objectives.  
Dan Fodio established the Sokoto Caliphate as well as shari’a law in what is now 
northern Nigeria.  The jihad also served to spread the religion from the Hausa/Fulani 
north, to the Yoruba in the southwest, converting nearly half of the Yoruba in the process.  
Had it not been for British colonials arriving and introducing Christianity in the south, 
further gains may have been made.  Regardless, the religious division in Nigeria today 
remains largely a result of preexisting tension that was further exacerbated by the Fulani 
Jihad and the coming of European missionaries.  Most of the Hausa/Fulani in the north  
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are Muslim, while the Yoruba in the southwest are split between Muslims and Christians.  
The Igbo, located in southeast Nigeria, are primarily Christian since the jihad did not 
reach them.   
Beyond the two major branches of Islam, Sunni and Shi’i, in Nigeria today there 
is a third branch known as Sufism (generally associated with Shi’ism).  Sufism is a more 
mystical form of Islam, in which followers seek to attain a closer union with Allah 
through ritualistic prayers and dances.  Sufi believers tend to follow the teaching of a 
particular teacher, and form brotherhoods (tariqas) around these beliefs.  Dan Fodio’s 
personal belief in Sufism ensured that Islam in Nigeria primarily took the form of Sufi 
brotherhoods following the jihad.  Specifically, the Sufi brotherhoods of the Qadiriyya 
(which dan Fodio followed) and Tijaniyya became the most popular and economically 
powerful of all the Muslim theologies.  This empowerment of the Sufi brotherhoods, 
coupled with the legacy of dan Fodio’s successful jihad, provides the foundation for 
radical Islamism in modern times. 
 
B. HISTORY OF THE MAITATSINE MOVEMENT 
Nearly two hundred years after the end of the Fulani Jihad, a new movement 
emerged in Nigeria with a similar goal.  The Maitatsine can be described as a radical 
Islamist group that sought to reject the modern world, while at the same time providing 
an outlet for those who suffered economic deprivation throughout the 1970s. In 1972 
Nigeria was recovering from a three-year civil war (1967-1970) following an attempt by 
the Eastern region to form the breakaway state of Biafra.  The war began as a result of 
ethnic and socioeconomic divisions between the Igbo of the Eastern Region, and the 
Hausa-Fulani of the Northern Region.41  Following the conclusion of the war, plans were 
made to return Nigeria to the civilian rule.  The military ruler at the time, General 
Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975), briefly allowed banned political activities to resume in 
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1972 to discuss plans for a new constitution.42  Once Gowon realized, however, that the 
intense politicized ethnic divisions remained, he reestablished the ban on political parties 
that had originated under his predecessor, General Aguiyi Ironsi (who had ruled between 
January and July 1966).43 
Gowon’s ban on political parties served to reinforce the position of the political 
elites in the northern Nigerian city of Kano at the time.  They governed with the help of 
the Sufi brotherhoods (tariqas).  Since the time of the Fulani Jihad, the Qadiriyya and 
Tijaniyya brotherhoods had grown economically powerful through their success in the 
cattle and kola nut trade.44  As a result of the Sufi’s wealth and membership base, 
political elites sought to co-opt them.  The Sufi brotherhoods were given more access to 
the benefits of the city such as housing and jobs in exchange for their support and 
cooperation.  Any newcomer to the city would then have to work through this Sufi 
network to try and obtain the same benefits.  Therefore, the arrangement worked out 
between the military and the tariqas ensured that as long as the tariqas were assured 
access to wealth and privilege, their members would continue to follow Kano’s military 
governor.  While this did not pose a problem for those who were already connected to the 
Qadiriyya or Tijaniyya, it excluded Muslims who believed other doctrines, or chose not 
to join the Sufi movements.45  Therefore, Sufis were able to monopolize the local 
economy to the exclusion of other Muslims.  Although there is no data available to 
establish the exact magnitude of this exclusion, hundreds if not thousands were 
unemployed, and thousands would eventually be drawn to the Maitatsine. 
While access to jobs and other amenities was becoming increasingly restricted in 
the Northern cities to members of Sufi brotherhoods, the pressures in urban areas were 
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increasing.  For a variety of reasons, including Nigeria’s oil boom, the pace of 
urbanization increased dramatically in the early 1970s.  One result of this trend was an 
increase in social spending in urban areas, (the introduction of free education was just 
one of these programs).46  Other funds were targeted to begin construction projects.  The 
overall result was that the quality of life in urban areas appeared to be much better than 
that in rural areas, thus spurring a migration from rural to urban areas by people seeking 
jobs and education.   
Along with this voluntary pull-factor, a nature-based push-factor was also 
operating.  Between 1972-1974, Nigeria suffered one of the worst droughts in its history.  
This drought, which severely reduced the harvest for those years, forced small-scale 
farmers to find other means of survival.47  As often happens during agrarian crises, many 
headed to the cities, though exact numbers are not known for these particular years.  
Housing and jobs could not keep pace with rural migration to the cities.  As urbanization 
increased throughout the 1970s, migrants from the rural areas began to find themselves 
excluded from housing and employment.  In the Kano region alone (not just the city of 
Kano), the urban population between 1963 and 1980 increased from 250,000 to 
2,000,000, while only 50,000 were employed through industrial labor.48  Given that 
political associations were banned at the time, new migrants who experienced economic 
deprivation could not rely on party politics to help change their conditions and quality of 
life.   
In addition to the ban on political parties, the ability of the state to influence 
events in Kano remained minimal.  Although there is no doubt the government was aware 
of the declining conditions due to the combination of drought and rural to urban 
migration, as it has already been illustrated, effective industry remained pitifully absent.  
Additionally, given the religious and ethnic differences between the North and South in 
Nigeria, any attempts by the state to change conditions in Kano would have been at a 
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lower priority level.  One example of the failure of the state to intervene in declining 
economic conditions can be seen in their handling of investments and returns.  During the 
first five years of the 1980s, over 23 billion naira was invested into state enterprises.  The 
net return on all those investments, over five years, came to less than 1 billion naira.49  
Additionally, industrial capacity had fallen to less than from 40% over the same time 
period.50  Clearly, even if the state had wanted to intervene, it seems highly unlikely that 
it could have made a difference given the poor economic shape it was in itself.  As a 
result, one’s economic condition in Kano completely depended on one’s affiliation with 
the Sufi informal networks.  As a result, many remained disenfranchised given their 
adherence to other forms of Islam. 
The influence of a single man, however, would eventually turn the lower class of 
Kano into a fighting force organized to establish an Islamic state.  They became known as 
the Maitatsine, one of the most volatile radical Islamist groups to ever emerge in Nigeria.  
The leader of the Maitatsine, a Cameroonian named Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa, was an 
itinerant preacher in Nigeria throughout the 1960s and 1970s.51  Marwa believed that the 
world was full of infidels, and that the only course of action was jihad to ensure an 
Islamic way of life.  He rejected symbols of the new materialistic world, such as Western 
education and modern appliances, which he believed to be pollutants to Islam itself.52  
Given that the Sufi elites had no qualms about obtaining material wealth, Marwa’s 
disassociation with the modern world was his way of critiquing what he viewed as 
excesses by the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods.  Despite his puritanical viewpoint, 
Marwa himself could be called a heretic by traditional followers of the Prophet 
Muhammad.  Marwa was a critic of both the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad.  He 
even modified Qur’anic text by replacing the Prophet’s name with his own, changing the 
number of prayers to be said in a day, and changing the direction one would face while 
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doing so.53  Marwa also had a reputation for being a powerful wielder of magic, and 
many, including the elites, would pay for his services to bring good luck to situations.  
Despite these heretical tendencies, Marwa considered himself a Muslim and used the 
Qur’an (albeit modified) as his source document for advocating violence.   
Sometime during the 1970s, Marwa established himself as an annabi, or prophet 
of Allah.  This act allowed Marwa to claim divine legitimacy since the Prophet 
Muhammad was considered to be the seal of the Islamic prophets.  Marwa then formed 
and organized the Maitatsine by utilizing almajiri, a system in which followers attached 
themselves to a leader for Islamic teaching.54  Parents sent their boys (aged 10-14 in the 
case of Marwa) to live with the teacher and travel with him across the country.  The 
children were expected to beg from pedestrians to earn their living if the parents had no 
money to send.  This system of organization established a hierarchical relationship 
between teacher and student, where the former had absolute authority over the latter. The 
organizational structure also allowed Marwa to gain fiscal resources to support and 
expand his group.  The more students a teacher had, the more money he could make, and 
therefore the almajiri system could be used to exploit children for their earning potential.  
Regardless of whether Marwa had such intentions or not, he was receiving more than 
$100 a day from his thousands of followers before the Maitatsine formed.55  While 
Marwa was adept at using the almajiri system to gain followers, he also appealed to a 
broader base of urban residents who suffered economic deprivation at the time. 
New migrants, excluded from the political and economic networks in Kano, often 
found themselves homeless, jobless, and ripe for the picking.  They thus began to form an 
urban underclass that could easily be recruited to support extremist causes. As pointed 
out by Falola: 
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Marwa was able to tap this reservoir.  Some were drawn to him directly by 
his preachings.  Others were recruited by his followers, who sought new 
members in parking lots, railway stations, and other public places.  To 
these homeless and poor migrants Marwa provided shelter, security, and 
alternative ways of negotiating the city.56 
The primary motivator for urban followers to join the movement thus seems to be 
exclusion from the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya Sufi brotherhoods that monopolized the 
distribution of resources in Kano.  Not only did the brotherhoods control the political and 
economic relief mechanisms, but they also controlled the Friday mosques within Kano, 
thus denying non-Sufis from receiving relief from that venue as well.57  Marwa exploited 
this condition by providing the soft landing that new migrants sought and had previously 
been denied.  By December 1980, Marwa had gained at least a few thousand followers.  
Marwa was arrested several times during and after Gowon’s reign for preaching without 
a permit.58  Authorities insisted that Marwa’s preaching was “not acceptable to the 
majority of our people as it is a total condemnation of the principles of Islam as accepted 
and practiced by the Moslems.”59  Confrontation ceased between 1975 and 1980, as 
followers of the Maitatsine secluded themselves in one part of Kano to pursue their own 
way of life in isolation. Over time, the Maitatsine sought to increase their land holdings 
by clearing out neighbors and illegally building on vacant lots.  The Maitatsine refused to 
recognize the sovereignty of the Nigerian federal government and established an Islamic 
state under shari’a law within their enclave.  The Maitatsine defended their territory, with 
military training provided by members who had previously been employed by the police 
or army.60  Such a practice is consistent with the idea of jihad, which seeks to defend the 
faith against tyrannical government oppression through violent means. 
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The turning point for Marwa came on November 26th, 1980.  On that date, the 
governor of Kano, Abubukar Rimi, issued an ultimatum calling for Marwa to leave the 
city within fourteen days.61  Marwa responded with a call to all of his followers to join 
him and defend their way of life against the infidels.  While it might be debatable 
whether or not the Maitatsine could be called a radical movement throughout the 1970s, 
there is no question that Rimi’s letter sparked Marwa to call the Maitatsine to jihad in 
defense of their homes.  According to Falola, Marwa “consolidated his defense base, 
prepared his followers for war, and stepped up Maitatsine harassment of the public.”62  
The stage had been set for the battle that would take place in December of 1980, known 
as the Maitatsine riots.63   
The violence started on December 8th, when the Kano police attempted to block 
the Maitatsine from preaching in an area known as the Shahuci Playing Ground, near the 
City Central Mosque.64  The 150-man police force “discharged smoke shells to scare 
them off, but sect members suddenly appeared from every side and attacked the police 
with machetes, arrows, swords, daggers, and other deadly weapons.”65  Sheer numbers 
alone dictated that the limited size of the police force could not contend with the 2000-
3000 members of the Maitatsine.66  As a result, the Kano police retreated.   
Emboldened by this victory, the Maitatsine decided to try to take as much 
territory as possible, and by December 19th they had gained control over the police 
station, public schools, and a mosque.  Random attacks occurred against members of the 
public, who were considered infidels, including rapes and the murder of school children.  
Additionally, the Maitatsine took 50-65 hostages and held them in their territory.67  The 
Maitatsine uprising was put down only when President Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) called 
                                                
61 Nicolas, 58. 
62 Falola, 152. 
63 Although often referred to as “riots,” given that the conflict began spontaneously, there is no doubt 
that the Maitatsine had planned to expand their territory in Kano previous to this incident.  The riots 
provided the opportunity to follow-through with these plans. 
64 Falola, 153. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Niels Kastfelt, “Rumours of Maitatsine: A Note on Political Culture in Northern Nigeria,” African 
Affairs 88, no. 350 (January 1989): 84. 
67 Watts and Lubek, 144. 
 21
                                                
the Nigerian army to action on December 28th.  Unlike the ineffective Kano police, the 
army troops quickly defeated the Maitatsine and killed Marwa in the process.  Afterward, 
the official tally of deaths from the riots came to 4,177 (though many estimates are 
higher).1 
The Maitatsine fractured after Marwa's death in 1980.  Various people tried to 
claim leadership, such as Musa Makaniki, who continued to lead supporters to cause 
death and damage (e.g., in March 1984 in Yola, where over 1,000 people died), but no 
leader controlled the entire movement as Marwa had.  Although there were sporadic 
incidents blamed on the Maitatsine (Gombe 1985 and 1987; Lagos 1998), none produced 
the amount of damage that had occurred under Marwa’s leadership.2  Musa Makaniki 
was finally arrested in 2003, without a movement and without followers.3  Thus, the last 
remnant of the Maitatsine movement seems to have disappeared for good. 
How do we explain the rise of the Maitatsine?  Several factors seem to have been 
critically important.  First of all, the coincidence of severe drought and an oil boom 
produced a flood of migrants to Kano in the mid-to late 1970s.  This suggests that 
exogenous factors, beyond the control of any government, can create conditions that 
foster the emergence of a radical, anti-establishment organization.  Specifically, in the 
case of the Maitatsine, exogenous factors (drought and oil boom) created rapid rural to 
urban migration in Kano.  This rapid urbanization changed the demographic balance of 
Kano society, leading to an increased potential for structural exclusion if governments are 
not prepared to absorb such an event. 
In the case of the Maitatsine, there was no capability for the Kano government to 
provide a soft landing to the new migrants, which meant they were left to the mercy of 
the informal networks in place at the time.  These networks, in the form of the Qadiriyya 
and  Tijaniyya  brotherhoods,  monopolized  the  production  of wealth and distribution of 
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resources in Kano.  New migrants could not obtain a job or housing without being a part 
of these informal networks.  Lack of membership in these brotherhoods left the urban 
migrants economically excluded and with increasing numbers of urban migrants, this 
economic exclusion became intolerable as more and more people suffered its effects.  
Thus, rapid urbanization created a large pool of unemployed, poor city-dwellers, 
who could then serve as potential recruits who were easily mobilizable by radical 
elements.  The exclusion of this pool of new migrants from economic opportunities 
further exacerbated the problem, and facilitated their incorporation into new, radical 
networks. 
Considering that the migration was largely beyond the control of the Nigerian 
government, this suggests that exogenous factors play a direct role in pushing exclusion 
to intolerable levels.  At the same time, however, political and economic structures are 
not beyond a government’s control, so the effect of exogenous factors will largely depend 
on how much capacity the state has to deal with unexpected crises that might lead to 
increased exclusion.  Should the state have no capacity to deal with such exclusion, then 
the situation should be considered ripe for the formation of a radical movement, though it 
does not mean one will form.  Additionally, depending on whether or not exclusion 
factors are within the government’s capacity to control, differing networks of exclusion 
may occur.  In the case of the Maitatsine, new immigrants to Kano faced the intra-
Muslim network of exclusion due to the existing socioeconomic structure.  At the same 
time, given the ban on political parties, a network of exclusion existed between the newly 
deprived immigrants of Kano and the government.  Once again, these networks of 
exclusion do not guarantee the emergence of a radical group, but they do provide 
structures that can be exploited to move people to a radical ideology.  Based on the 
evidence presented in the chapter, it seems that structures alone cannot form the 
movement, and that some allowance must be given to the effects of human agency. 
A third conclusion inferred from the Maitatsine chapter, is that leadership was a 
crucial factor in the formation of the group.  One individual, Alhaji Muhammadu Marwa, 
was able to exploit the conditions of exclusion that existed at the local level to gather 
followers to form his radical movement.  The fact that Marwa consciously sought out 
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new migrants who could not find shelter or a job indicates that he had keen insight into 
how he could provide for the needs of the people.  It is difficult to say if there was a 
specific quality about Marwa himself that should be highlighted, or whether as long as 
the message was the same, anyone could have filled his shoes and started a movement.  
The Maitatsine’s fragmentation after Marwa’s death gives, however, indicates that he did 
possess some personal qualities that helped draw followers to him specifically.  A 
movement is a two-way street.  Although a radical movement cannot form without a 
leader who can exploit structural conditions to gain followers, there must also be 
followers who are willing to embrace such a message.  In this case of the Maitatsine, 
there is clear evidence to suggest that people joined the group for the material benefits 
offered to them, but whether or not those benefits kept them in the movement remains a 
mystery.  Perhaps Marwa was able to lure them in with the material benefits, and then 
indoctrinate them into his theological beliefs over time.  Perhaps followers felt a sense of 
social identity even if they did not believe in the doctrines.  Again, it is impossible to 
know without further research, but it does suggest that the issue of leadership should be 
explored on an equal level with the idea of followership.  Both variables would provide 
further evidence on how agency can interact with structures to form a radical movement. 
The final conclusion that can be inferred from this chapter is that exclusion drove 
the Maitatsine to violence only when the group became the specific target of a 
government action.  The ultimatum issued by Governor Rimi suggested that the 
Maitatsine would basically be removed from the social scene altogether in Kano.  This 
type of direct threat to a group’s existence might be seen as a tipping event that turns a 
radical Islamist movement to violence.  Up until this point in the thesis, radical Islamist 
group formation has been presented as an event that is assumed to happen quickly.  
However, the evidence presented in this chapter from the Maitatsine suggests that 
followers of Islamist movements may not choose violence from the beginning, but 
instead are made radical by the exclusionary actions of others at the local level.   
Overall, the evidence the Maitatsine case suggests that the formation of a radical 
Islamist movement is a process and not an instantaneous event.  First, the history of 
Nigeria shows that the Fulani Jihad of 1804-1808 provided a basis for politicized 
oppositional Islam in the North.  Once the government banned political parties in 1966, 
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patronage networks ran almost exclusively through the Sufi brotherhoods in Kano.  These 
brotherhoods gained more influence once exogenous factors brought increased 
urbanization to the city.  The sudden influx of new migrants directly led to a level of 
economic deprivation that could not be handled by the state.  Therefore, those migrants 
who wanted housing and employment had to use the existing informal networks among 
the Sufi brotherhoods, which had the capacity to provide social goods.  As a result, an 
excluded group of non-Sufi Muslims continued to suffer from economic deprivation.  At 
this point, human agency, in the form of Marwa, stepped in to exploit these conditions.  
He personally appealed to the disenfranchised created from those immigrants excluded 
by the Sufi brotherhoods, which directly led to the formation of the Maitatsine.   The 
disintegration of the group following Marwa’s death illustrates that his personal 
leadership was a critical factor in formation.  Finally, it is clear that the Maitatsine turned 
to violence as a direct result of government efforts to repress the group.  Therefore 
Islamic opposition foundations, lack of political participation, exogenous push/pull 
factors, economic deprivation, a pool of potential recruits created by exclusion, personal 
leadership, and government repression are all factors that contributed to the formation of 
a radical Islamist group in Nigeria.  Further research is required to assess the 
generalizability of these case-specific conclusions.  If they hold up to analysis in other 
Sub-Saharan African countries, we will have significantly advanced our understanding 
the conditions under which radical Islamic groups form in this region.  As a first step in 
this direction, chapter three considers the case of Tanzania, which has not experienced 
radical Islamic group formation, despite its many similarities to Nigeria. 
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III. ISLAMIST MOBILIZATION IN TANZANIA  
Chapter II focused on conditions in the city of Kano, Nigeria to determine causes 
for radical Islamist movement formation there.  The following case study of Zanzibar 
City, provides an initial test of the generalizability of the findings of the previous chapter.  
Specifically, it shows that in the absence of a history of politicized oppositional Islam, 
and with multiple informal patronage networks embedded within the city rather than 
resting exclusively with Islamic brotherhoods, radical Islamist groups did not form in 
response to exogenous economic shocks that occurred in 2003.  The result of the analysis 
will be able to provide fruitful avenues for future research and implications for U.S. 
policy that will be addressed in Chapter IV. 
There are three primary reasons for comparing Zanzibar City to Kano.  First, they 
are both predominately Muslim areas in religiously diverse countries.  Second, the 
estimated population of Zanzibar City is similar to that of Kano municipal area (roughly 
200,000), making the level of analysis generally the same.71  Finally, just as exogenous 
shocks led to increased urbanization in Kano during the 1970s, similar events in 2003 
have contributed to an already increased urbanization rate in Zanzibar City making the 
two cities valid comparisons to identify variables for further research.72 
Similar to Nigeria, much of the tension that exists in Zanzibar today can be traced 
back to its colonial history rooted from interactions in the 19th Century.73  The British 
government itself became interested in Zanzibar in the late 18th Century as an ally to help 
protect maritime shipping interests between Britain and India.  With the location of 
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Zanzibar on the eastern coast of Africa, directly in the route of shipping lanes from India, 
securing influence over Zanzibar and protecting access to these lanes from pirates was a 
priority for the British.  Arab traders, who were already established on Zanzibar from as 
early as 780 A.D., were masters of navigation in the Indian Ocean.  They frequently 
brought back sought-after goods to the Middle East such as ivory, gold, amber, tortoise 
shells, cowry shells, rhino horns, gum, skins, wood, and slaves and knew the currents 
well.74    Therefore, the British co-opted the traders, who were predominately Omani by 
the 18th Century, to help combat the piracy threat.  The two parties signed agreements in 
1798 and 1800 in an effort to protect British commercial interests, which became the 
foundation of British-Zanzibari relations.75  However, the British would have their 
greatest impact in Zanzibar in the 19th Century in the waning days of the Omani 
Sultanate. 
In 1828, Seyyid Said, who was the ruler of the Busaidi dynasty from Oman, 
decided he wanted to move the capital of his Sultanate to Zanzibar.  He set up a 
government on Unguja Island, centered in “Stone Town.”76  The arrival of the Omanis 
permanently changed the social demographics and power relations in Zanzibar, primarily 
through expropriation of land and the slave trade.  When the Omani Sultanate arrived in 
Zanzibar, the Wahadimu were the majority group on Unguja.77  In a forced negotiation 
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with the head leader, the Mwinyi Mkuu, the Sultan essentially took over all external 
economic affairs and demanded a supply of labor and a head tax from the Wahadimu.  In 
return, the Wahadimu were allowed to maintain their preexisting form of political 
governance.78  During the 1880s the Arab aristocracy moved into rural landowning for 
clove production, migrating into land previously owned by the Wahadimu.  In the 
resultant division of labor, the Arabs owned the plantations and the Wahadimu became 
servants, usually in the household or through share-cropping on the Arab land, due to a 
labor agreement made previously between the Sultan and the Mwinyi Mkuu.79  As a 
result, a ruler-subject relationship developed between the Arabs and the Wahadimu, with 
class and ethnic cleavages reinforcing each other. 
The Arabs created an additional ruler-subject mentality on the island by importing 
the slaves, which would have future repercussions.  Besides establishing a ruler-subject 
relationship with the Wahadimu, the Arabs also imported slaves from the African 
mainland to help work their newly found clove farms in the 19th Century.  Zanzibar had 
previously been a primary exporter of slaves for Indian Ocean consumers through 1822.  
The Moresby Treaty, which severely limited trading throughout East Africa, combined 
with the cessation of the West Africa slave trade, cut profits the Omani slave export trade 
in half forcing them to look for a new market.80  The Omani Sultanate decided that slaves 
would be imported to Zanzibar itself to help work their newly acquired clove plantations.  
This introduction of mainland Africans as slaves, who were predominately animist, not 
only created a second ruler-subject mentality between Arabs and mainland Africans, it 
also reinforced the identity of the Wahadimu as indigenous Muslims creating a cleavage 
between the two groups of Africans as they worked side by side for the Arabs. 
As British imperialism increased throughout the mid-nineteenth century in 
Zanzibar, Arab power and influence began to wane.  The primary example of this 
downturn came when the British forced the Sultan to abolish the Omani slave trade in 
Zanzibar in 1873.  The Sultan had the choice of either signing a treaty ending all slavery, 
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or facing a British naval blockade of Zanzibar.  Given that a hurricane the year prior had 
destroyed much of the clove crop on Unguja, and all but one ship in the Sultan’s Navy, 
he had little choice but to accept the British ultimatum.81  Zanzibar became a British 
Protectorate in 1891 following the European Scramble for Africa, and slavery was no 
longer legal on Zanzibar at all by 1897.  The newly emancipated slaves now had new 
choices at hand.  The policy implemented by the British forced the freed Africans to find 
wage-earning jobs, continue working for their former masters, or go into subsistence 
farming.  Many of the ex-slaves decided to continue to work under contract for their ex-
masters while the Wahadimu continued their subsistence farming and worked the clove 
plantations only at harvest.82  Interestingly, the British abolition of slavery led to a 
decrease in labor for the clove plantations, which forced them to bring in more workers 
from the mainland to maintain the colonial economy, which was based on cloves.  As 
such, the new immigrants, found themselves either working for large landowners (who 
were predominately Arab or Asian) or for merchants within the urban areas, where South 
Asians dominated the export sector.83  Thus the onset of imperialism also exacerbated a 
preexisting class cleavage among Asians and Africans that continues until this day. 
The British administration of Zanzibar through the Omani Sultanate continued to 
maintain the ethnic divide. The British progressed from a system of indirect rule over 
Zanzibar in the late 19th Century to a more direct influence in local affairs, such as 
deciding who would be the next Sultan at the turn of the 20th Century.84  After World 
War I, the British moved toward a new policy of promoting increased state capacity 
within Zanzibar.  Toward this end, they decided to empower a greater bureaucracy to 
help administer budgets, education, health, and other social services.85  Perhaps the 
greatest legacy of this policy is that the administrators of this expanded government were 
not Africans, but Arabs.  The British had always believed Zanzibar to be an Arab 
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possession, so they made no effort toward empowering Africans to take an active role in 
the government or to receive higher education.86  This policy ensured that the minority 
would receive the benefits of education and jobs over the African majority.  Furthermore, 
the British programs led to greater inequality between Arabs and Africans that 
exacerbated the preexisting divisions among ethnic and class lines, ultimately leading to 
revolution in 1964. 
In January 1964, a mainland African, “Field Marshall” John Okello from Uganda, 
launched a revolution with the support of a few hundred civilians to wrest power from the 
Arabs.  Okello drew his support primarily from other mainland Africans.  He started his 
efforts toward a revolution with 330 recruits, and only 30 of those men hailed from 
Zanzibar itself.87  Of course, many of Okello’s men had no formal training, so he also 
attempted to bring members of the Zanzibari police force on his side.  He specifically 
targeted the mainland African members because he believed that many indigenous 
Zanzibaris were interrelated with the Arabs and could not be trusted.88  
Some accounts of the revolution give more credit for starting the revolution to the 
members of the Afro-Shirazi Party Youth League (ASPYL), than to Okello.89  According 
to these historians, the ASPYL members decided to launch a revolution after becoming 
disenfranchised with the older generation of leadership within the party for not taking 
action after losing elections in 1963.  Regardless of which version of history one accepts, 
the salient point is that the ASPYL did consist of primarily of mainland Africans, and 
there is no dispute that Okello himself led the disenfranchised members of this 
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organization into revolution.90  Although Okello’s own account of the events are chalked 
full of self-aggrandizement, the use of mainlanders to carry out the revolution, regardless 
of who deserves the most credit, once again illustrates the division that existed between 
the Shirazi and other Africans on Zanzibar. 
The violence associated with the 1964 revolution primarily took place on Unguja, 
since that is where the Arab domination had the greatest effect on the Wahadimu and 
mainland Africans.  Once Okello’s forces succeeded in taking the island, several African 
leaders formed the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council, which was led by Abeid Karume, 
himself a mainland African from Nyasaland (Malawi).  In an effort to maintain his lock 
on power, Karume successfully exiled Okello, and subsequently met with Tanganyika 
President Julius Nyerere and agreed to form a union between Zanzibar and Tanganyika, 
thereby creating the modern country of Tanzania.91  From the start of this union, the 
Zanzibari government structures, including the presidency, were maintained by and 
subordinated to the national government of Tanzania.  The Zanzibari government 
continues to make many fiscal and legal decisions for the islands, but it can be overruled 
by the national government.   
Religious tension exists throughout Tanzania.  In Tanzania as a whole, religious 
affiliations are evenly divided among Christianity, Islam and local Animist beliefs, while 
Zanzibar is 99% Muslim.92  Muslim-Christian tension occurs on the Tanzanian mainland, 
with religious tension on Zanzibar being almost exclusively intra-Muslim.  A better 
understanding of the religious divides throughout Tanzania can be gained by exploring 
the advent of Islam into the region, and how it has competed with Christianity, Animism, 
and the dividing sects within itself.  Additionally, a history of the advent of Islam can 
illustrate what role the religion has played in fomenting opposition movements that can 
be compared against the Nigerian movements later on in the chapter. 
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A. THE ADVENT OF ISLAM IN TANZANIA 
 The earliest recorded history of Islam in Tanzania comes from the Muslim 
geographer Al-Masudi.  In the tenth century, he wrote that the rulers of the island of 
Qanbalu (Zanzibar) were Muslims who had arrived as early as 750 A.D.93 
Archaeological evidence of the existence of a mosque dated 1107-1108 A.D. on Zanzibar 
corroborates the presence of Islam on the island.94  The establishment of the mosque 
indicates that by the 12 Century AD, there was already a sufficient Muslim population in 
Zanzibar to finance the mosque’s construction. Historical evidence suggests that between 
the ninth and twelfth centuries, merchants from the Persian Gulf were active in the area 
between the city of Siraf (in modern day Iran) and Zanzibar.95  Omani merchants were 
the primary carriers of trade between East Africa and Siraf.96  Although Omani interests 
were purely mercantilist in nature, as they sought Africans to meet the demand for slave 
labor in the Persian Gulf, they also brought Islam to the African coast.97  Thus it seems 
likely that Islam was introduced to coastal Tanzania and Zanzibar during the same time 
period.    
 Followers of Islam in Tanzania today generally fall into one of three categories: 
Sunni, Ismaili Shi’ite (also know as Sevener Shi’ite), or Sufi.   Although Islam found its 
roots in traders in Tanzania, the solidification of the religion as a whole did not take place 
until the Omani Sultanate brought it to the islands as part and parcel of the state.  Since 
most Zanzibaris already practiced the religion to some extent, there was no resistance to 
having it become the official religion of the state.  As the Omani Sultanate was not 
concerned with spreading Islam as much as its own wealth, it made no concerted effort in 
the 19th Century to convert the mainland Africans or establish a foothold in the inner 
portions of modern-day Tanzania.  Aside from the focus on material wealth, another 
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reason for this lack of push is that the Arabs who led the Omani Sultanate on Zanzibar 
followed the Ibadi sect of Islam.  This sect, which is neither Sunni nor Shi’a, believes that 
its followers are the only true Muslims.98  The distinction is significant because the Ibadi 
sect believes that tolerance of other Muslims is acceptable, and they do need not to be 
converted.   
 While the Omanis in Zanzibar practiced Ibadi Islam, the Africans generally 
continued to be influenced by the Shafi’ite school of Sunni Islam.  Consistent with the 
tolerance of Ibadi Islam, the Sultanate allowed Africans to use mosques built by the 
Ibadis to practice their Sunni beliefs, and made no effort to eradicate the animist 
traditions that were often integrated into the practice of Islam by local Africans.99  As a 
result, opposition to the expropriation of land from the Wahadimu, and the enslavement 
of mainland Africans remained complete outside the religious realm.  In other words, the 
politically salient divide in Zanzibar was not religious and economic, as it was in Kano, 
but ethnic and economic. 
 Many of the followers of the Ibadi sect were driven out during the 1964 revolution 
since they were generally Omanis tied to the Sultanate and the post-independence 
government.  Thus, the political power that had been associated with the Ibadis passed 
from an Islamic sect to a secular government.  Thus the three major branches of Islam 
were all that remained on Zanzibar.  Exact figures of how many Muslims belong to each 
group are unknown, but the Sunni presence, particularly of the Shafi’i school of legal 
jurisprudence, tends to be followed by Arab and African alike.  The Shafi’i Sunnis is 
generally considered the majority group of the three branches of Islam on Zanzibar.  
Although they are the majority, they do not have exclusive control over political or 
economic power among the Muslims in Zanzibar.  The Ismailis (who follow the Aga 
Khan as their spiritual leader) do have such power however.  The Ismailis tend to be from 
South Asian descent, making them a minority of the population.  However, intermarriage 
with Africans in the last two decades has brought some diversification to ethnicity within 
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their ranks.100  Despite this limited representation among the population, the Asian 
Ismailis have the most control over the formal economy of Zanzibar.  Most are merchants 
and the money-lenders who became established on the island during the time of the 
Sultanate.101  Of the numerous Sufi orders in Tanzania, the most popular are the 
Qadiriyya and the Shahadiliyya, an order which originated in the Comoros.102  As late 
importations to the Swahili culture, the Sufi brotherhoods only influenced a small 
proportion of society with no noticeable gains in political or economic power.103  As 
such, the power of Islam resides predominately in the economic realm, but almost 
exclusively with the Ismaili sect given their dominance over the formal economy of 
Zanzibar.   
 The historical inheritance of Islam in Tanzania and its influence on the 
mobilization of radical groups is quite different from that observed in Nigeria.  First, 
there is no historical basis for political opposition or forced conversion in Tanzania as 
compared to the Fulani Jihad.  While the colonial influence helped exacerbate preexisting 
ethnic and religious divisions within Tanzania, the religious divide occurs at the national 
level, while the local level still experiences intra-Muslim rivalry.  In contrast to Nigeria, 
it is not the Sufi brotherhoods who are the empowered Muslim group in Tanzania, but the 
Shi’ite Ismailis with their control over the formal economy despite their minority status 
among Muslims in the country.  Thus, the foundation for radical Islamist movements in 
Tanzania has no historical precedent, but clearly there is an intra-Muslim rivalry that 
exists in the country.  A closer examination at this rivalry at the local level in needed to 
help explain why no radical groups have formed to date. 
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B. OPPORTUNITY FOR MOBILIZATION 
 This section will analyze the effects of an exogenous economic shock on Zanzibar 
City and how various communities responded to the problem.  Examining how this crisis 
is dealt with in Zanzibar will provide an initial base of comparison against the Maitatsine 
movement in Kano, and further our understanding of why a radical group formed in 
Nigeria, but not in Tanzania.  After a review of the economic shock of 2003 and its 
effects in Zanzibar City, I will consider whether the independent variables identified in 
the previous chapter can account for the absence of significant Islamic mobilization in 
this case.  These factors once again are: a history of Islamist opposition, an exogenous 
economic shock, a pool of potential recruits created by political and economic exclusion, 
personal leadership, and government repression.  We have already established that the 
first condition did not exist in Zanzibar.  I have intentionally selected a time of economic 
crisis in Zanzibar in order to facilitate an analysis of the impact of the remaining 
endogenous variables -- political and economic exclusion, leadership, and repression -- 
on the likelihood of radical Islamist mobilization in response to economic crisis.  Before 
looking in depth at the crisis however, it is necessary to present a background on the 
political and economic structures of Zanzibar City prior to the exogenous shocks as a 
basis for understanding the impact. 
First, the regime type in Zanzibar City in 2003 was completely different than in 
Kano in the 1970s.  Multiparty elections were outlawed in Tanzania (to include local 
Zanzibari elections) until 1995.  Today, Zanzibar City is dominated by a two-party 
democracy, where the Chama Cha Mapinduzi, the former single-party allowed in 
Tanzania, always comes out the winner during elections.  Within the context of Zanzibar 
City itself, previous elections have led to allegations of stolen ballots along with irregular 
practices by the government-controlled Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC).  The ZEC 
decided to rerun 16 of the 50 seats in the Zanzibar House of Representatives during the 
2000 elections, all 16 of which came from within Zanzibar City itself.  The run-offs 
resulted in a unanimous CCM victory within the city.104  The Civic United Front (CUF), 
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which is the main opposition party, has become increasingly frustrated by this apparent 
cheating by the CCM, as it is continually denied access to political power.  However, 
given that the CUF still has the freedom to assemble and bring a political voice to the 
people, there is no political exclusion as far as party participation is concerned.  Upon 
further examination of the sources of relief within the city, it will be made evident that 
the parties certainly played a part in absorbing the exogenous shock, but that they were 
not the only source of social relief. 
Placement within the socioeconomic economic stratification within Zanzibar City, 
prior to the 2003 shock, depended largely on one’s ethnic background.  The majority of 
the formal economy within Zanzibar City is dominated by two industries: merchant trade 
and tourism.  The former sector, which is the most heavily dominated in the city, is 
almost exclusively controlled by the Ismaili South Asians.  They are not only the 
merchant owners, but they are generally the money-lenders to other communities within 
the city as well.  However, the Ismailis tend to take care of their own sect when it comes 
to social benefits first.  Ismailis will routinely find housing for new arrivals to the island 
who are members of the sect.  However, one must remember that the Ismaili sect is 
dominated by South Asians, who make up less than 5% of the population on Zanzibar, 
therefore such relief can be argued to be based on ethnicity in addition to religion.  
Regardless, since most Africans follow the Sunni traditions of Islam, they are effectively 
excluded from this formal employment network in spite of their non-Asian background.  
Of course, it is still possible to be informally employed by these merchants, but that will 
be covered in more detail later in this section.   
The other dominant formal economic sector of the city is the tourist industry.  
This growing industry, which is predominately owned by foreign investors, tends to hire 
mainland Africans who are migrant laborers at the expense of the local Zanzibaris.105  
Therefore, the local Zanzibaris must turn to the informal sector to make money in order 
to survive.  Unemployment in Zanzibar runs between 36-40%, and its impact is felt 
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primarily among youths who make up over 50% of the population.106  This figure in turn 
means that a significant number of citizens in Zanzibar City must somehow find work in 
the informal sector, and it is this excluded group of individuals who were most likely at 
risk for joining a radical Islamist movement following the exogenous economic shock of 
2003.  
Zanzibar experienced its most severe economic shock in 2003, when its two most 
important economic sectors, cloves and tourism, experienced simultaneous and dramatic 
losses.  This shock only served to increase the number of unemployed looking for relief, 
and thereby added to the pool of potential recruits for a radical Islamist movement.   A 
slump in the clove market led to a 60% drop in revenue, and a travel warning for 
Zanzibar produced a 30% drop in tourism in 2003.  These hits directly led to the 
immediate loss of $90 million and 1,000 jobs.107  Additionally, while some new 
immigrants may have come from subsistence farms prior to moving to the city, they were 
now required to pay for their meals.  Given the lack of employment associated with the 
2003 shocks, combined with a 9% increase in food prices in 2003 (as compared to a 1.4% 
increase in other goods), new immigrants needed to find jobs or networks to help provide 
them with this basic survival necessity since they would have lacked consistent income to 
pay for the food.108  In an effort to absorb the shocks, the unemployed youths had two 
primary sources of relief available to them: political party youth wings and the mosques.  
The relief given to youths by the CCM and the CUF are virtually the same.  Both 
parties organized youth wings that included paramilitary training, primarily in the form of 
unarmed combat.109  This practice stems from a historical precedent of the ruling party 
                                                
106 Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan: Six Months Progress 
Report January – June 2004, 15. Available [Online]: http://www.zprp.org/0reports.htm  [7 June 2005]. 
107 “Zanzibar Hit as Tourists Stay Away,” BBC News Online, 2 May 2003. Available [Online]: 
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109 Judica Tarimo, “Govt Bans CUF ‘Military’ Training,” The Guardian, 2 April 2004.  Available 
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using previous youth wings and the Young Pioneers (similar to the Boy Scouts of 
America) to help further party goals in exchange for government jobs in the future.110  
While the members of today’s youth wings were meant to be trained in techniques for 
providing security to party members, it has been alleged that the true intention of these 
wings is to train youths to disrupt elections.111  While no alleged violence took place 
during 2003, both parties have blamed the other for pre-election violence in 2005 with 
the bombing of a CCM office and the burning of a CUF leader’s home.112  As such, 
turning to either party in 2003 was not done out of a need to express violence at the time 
(given that it was not an election year), but out of the need to receive some relief from the 
economic situation at hand. 
A political network was not the only place relief for the urban youth to find in 
Zanzibar City.  The more than 50 mosques within the city provided an excellent 
alternative to Muslims where they could find education, a meal, shelter, and potential job 
placement.113  At the same time however, the influx of new youths into the mosques gave 
potential radical leaders a captive audience from which they might lure in a willing pool 
of recruits through sermons aimed at generating hate and violence.  Within Zanzibar, it is 
normal to have itinerant preachers (tabligh) travel from mosque to mosque preaching 
various sermons.  Of particular concern in the current decade is the increase of radical 
preachers who follow Wahhabi schools of thought as opposed to the Shafi’ite school.  
The former preach an intolerant form of Islam that is particularly popular in Saudi Arabia 
(where it originated) and among radical Islamist movements such as Al-Qaida.  After 
preaching such a message, the tabligh are reported to offer the chance for disenfranchised 
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Muslims to join Al-Qaida while others may decide to become tabligh themselves.114  
One of the most notorious tabligh to be recruited for Al-Qaida out of Zanzibar was 
Ahmed Ghailani, an alleged mastermind behind the 1998 Dar Es Salaam and Nairobi 
embassy bombings.115  At least one group has been inspired by such teachings, the Simba 
wa Mungu (Lions of God).116 
The Lions of God are not a well-known group, and they only seem to generate 
press coverage when there is some sort of violence attributed to their name.  The first 
attributed report of violence to them occurred in November of 2002 when they attacked 
women with canes who were dressed in tight dresses.117  The perpetrators reportedly 
came from the Makuti Mosque within Zanzibar City, and police presence increased as a 
result.118  Given that the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan occurred at the time, it seems 
plausible that sentiments among the conservative Muslim were running high, and variant 
of caning is common in other Islamic countries for minor infractions (most notably Saudi 
Arabia).  This attachment of this group to assault women during Ramadan seems 
consistent.  In late October 2003, two Christian women from the Tanzania mainland were 
attacked by Lions of God members for not adhering to the conservative dress code just 
after the beginning of the holy month.119  It was reported that most of the members of the 
Lions of God tend to operate in the Darajani business district.120  This district is home to 
the local informal market where one can find just about any type of second hand clothes, 
local trinkets, and various foods and fowl.  The young businessmen in the market are 
well-known for their adherence to Islam and its traditions.  For example, chickens are 
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killed at the only slaughterhouse in the market through the halal method which includes 
prayers and the draining of blood while facing toward Mecca.121  Given that the Lions 
primarily seem concerned with adherence to Islamic standards, it is inappropriate to say 
they are a radical Islamic group.  They are simply conservative Muslims who use limited 
violence to maintain standards established by their faith.    Since this group is cannot be 
defined as a radical Islamist movement, the question remains as to why the tabligh could 
not take the pool of potential recruits and transform them into a viable radical Islamist 
group form within Zanzibar City? 
The primary reason is that the political and economic conditions did not provide 
enough justification for tabligh to create radical groups from the potential pool of recruits 
in Zanzibar City because of preexisting networks that could absorb the exogenous shock 
of 2003.  The tabligh could not offer anything better for the Muslims of Zanzibar City, 
except to take out their frustrations and enact change through radical Islam along 
Wahhabi standards.122  It has already been demonstrated that the Zanzibaris do not have 
the historical inheritance of using Islam to effect violent change.  Further complicating 
the recruitment of radicals is the fact that Zanzibaris were not subject to a tyrannical 
government that might justify the use of jihad to establish change.123  There are no 
reports of the Zanzibari government conducting any repression against Zanzibari 
Muslims during 2003.  Additionally, given the freedom of political parties to exist, and 
the freedom to assemble and train youth wings, Zanzibaris already had an alternative 
option for expressing discontent that does have historical basis.  The tabligh clearly had 
no political justification in recruiting followers.  Economically, while it certainly true that 
the Zanzibaris were excluded from the formal sector of employment by the Ismaili 
merchants and foreign-owned tourism, these same businesses provided informal 
employment to whoever brought in clients, regardless of ethnicity or religion.  Nearly 
37,000 are estimated to work in this informal sector while only 5,800 work in the formal 
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40 
sector.124  Thus, economic relief through the informal sector was available for those who 
were willing to try.  Clearly, the Lions of God followers worked within this sector given 
their association to the Darajani market district.  Therefore, Zanzibari Muslims had the 
means to survive the exogenous shocks through endogenous networks.  Thus, despite the 
appeals of the tabligh, the potential pool of recruits simply turned to the informal political 
and economic networks that existed within the city, thereby achieving the goal of urban 
survival without resorting to violence. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
Tanzania lacks both the historical inheritance of oppositional Islam, and the 
degree of economic and political exclusion that were present in Nigeria at the time of the 
Maitatsine.  While it is impossible to determine whether one or the other or both acted as 
a brake on radical Islamist mobilization in Zanzibar City at the time of the 2003 
economic crisis, the analysis does suggest that future research should seek to test the 
impact of these factors more systematically.  The exogenous shocks of 2003 easily 
generated an additional pool of recruits for potential Islamist mobilization, but the 
subsequent formation of a radical group did not occur.  The best place to find these 
potential followers would have been in the mosques themselves, as people sought relief 
through the limited services provided.  Thus, the exclusion that felt by the 
disenfranchised from the formal sector had been mitigated through inclusion in the 
mosque.  While these people were in the mosque, radical tabligh preached Wahhabi-
inspired sermons, which led the Zanzibari government to deport the fiery preachers.  
While the Lions of God may have been inspired by the teachings, the fact that they 
operated only during Ramadan as a religious group and not as a political group bent on 
overthrowing the government, suggests that the tabligh had no success in mobilizing 
radical followers.  The answer as to why the followers did not mobilize is where future 
researchers can help.  The ideas postulated in this thesis, lack of historical inheritance and 
the degree of political or economic exclusion seems to be the most logical variables to 
test in future studies.  On the latter issues specifically, researchers must ascertain the 
informal networks that are available to excluded groups to help mitigate political and/or 
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economic crises.   Such a study would then set the baseline for determining the degree of 
exclusion that is occurring in the country and how it might relate to radical Islamist group 
formation.  However, until future researchers are able to validate or invalidate these 
variables, it seems prudent to list the implications that the findings of this thesis has on 
U.S. policy in Africa.  By emphasizing a proactive instead of reactive solution, it is 
possible that the U.S., in cooperation with its African partners, can eradicate the 
underlying conditions that lead to radical Islamist movements.  The final chapter of this 
thesis will propose solutions that should help prevent these groups from arising if the 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
Chapters II and III attempted to uncover why radical Islamist movements form by 
using an inductive approach through comparative case studies of northern Nigeria and 
Zanzibar.  This chapter concludes the thesis by highlighting the findings obtained through 
the analysis, and applying them to current U.S. counter terrorism policy in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  By utilizing the findings of the case studies, it is hoped a more tailored and 
effective policy can be applied toward the continent that will truly focus on diminishing 
underlying conditions of terrorism.  Additionally, this thesis hopes to provide a starting 
point for developing a more systematic approach to understanding the conditions that 
lead to radical Islamist group formation.  The overall goal is to stop radical Islamist 
groups from arising in sub-Saharan Africa, effectively ending the war on terrorism on 
that continent before it ever begins. 
 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The formation of the radical Islamist Maitatsine in Nigeria seems to have been 
caused by the interaction of several different factors.  First, rapid urbanization in the 
context of drought and economic recession caused the ranks of the marginalized 
unemployed to swell suddenly.  Second, the new Muslim arrivals economic opportunities 
were further limited by their exclusion from patronage networks controlled by Sufi 
brotherhoods.  Third, channels for expressing discontent arising from social and 
economic marginalization were severely limited: political parties were banned, and social 
and economic outlets were controlled by the Sufi brotherhoods.    In the absence of other 
alternatives, the limited relief offered by Marwa's personal movement became attractive.  
Thus, the Nigerian case suggests that an exogenous economic shock, exacerbated by the 
economic exclusion of marginalized urban migrants, created a pool of potential recruits 
for radical Islamist groups, but that the movement actually took shape only in response to 
the personal appeals of a radical Islamist leader.  Zanzibar City underwent a similar 
exogenous economic shock in 2003 that led to a loss of jobs, increased food prices, and 
additional rural to urban migrations among the youth.  The state had no capacity to 
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absorb the shocks and depended on local communities to deal with it themselves.  It is 
here that the case studies illustrate the most striking difference.  Where the Sufis had near 
complete control of the patronage system in Kano, it is clear that multiple avenues of 
political and economic relief existed within Zanzibar City to mitigate the economic crisis 
faced by many.  While it is true that the Ismaili Asians controlled the formal merchant 
and foreigners owned the formal tourist industry, the native Zanzibaris who were 
excluded could still find employment through the informal sector.  Additionally, 
inclusion could be found within political party youth wings and throughout mosques 
within the city where one could obtain training, education and a meal.  Therefore, it is 
clear that the addition of multiple channels of relief within Zanzibar City helped mitigate 
the economic exclusion suffered by primarily the native Zanzibaris. As such, the cases 
studies suggest that the level of disenfranchisement in Zanzibar City was not as high as in 
Kano, thereby decreasing the size of the pool of potential recruits available for 
exploitation by a radical leader.  Additionally, Tanzania lacks the historical inheritance of 
having Islamist movements enact violent change as compared to Nigeria, making it all 
that much harder for a radical leader to justify violent reactions in the name of Islam.  
The Lions of God, while certainly using limited violence against women who did not 
dress conservatively, is limited to a few youths who are overly zealous during Ramadan, 
and not a personalized movement bent on radical overthrow of the state.  Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that no radical Islamist movement formed in Zanzibar City during the time 
of the economic crisis because informal networks were able to absorb the urban youth 
who suffered from the exogenous shock, thereby denying radical tabligh the political or 
economic justification needed to lure the pool of potential recruits into joining a radical 
Islamist movement in contrast to the appeals of Marwa to his recruits in Kano who had 
limited political and economic options. 
Based on the analysis of both cases, it can be hypothesized that economic 
exclusion at the local level provides a pool of potential recruits that might be led to 
mobilize for violent or nonviolent opposition by a human agent.  High levels of economic 
exclusion were associated with the emergence of the Maitatsine, while lower levels of 
exclusion in Zanzibar, a result of more complex relief networks, did not provide tabligh 
enough justification to produce a radical Islamist group.  Since the exclusion and the 
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mitigating networks both took place within local, urban areas as opposed to the national 
level structures, such a finding suggests that scholars need to focus their analysis on 
conditions at the sub-national level to predict radical group emergence vice the emphasis 
on the national level that is prevalent in scholarship today.  
Of course, since structural conditions alone did not produce a radical movement, 
it is also necessary to more fully develop the study of human agency and its ability to 
exploit the disenfranchised.  The case of the Maitatsine appears to show that the violence 
exhibited by that group occurred as a direct result of the orders of Marwa.  How is such a 
leader able to exploit conditions to the point it drives people to violence?  It has already 
been suggested that if a society has the historical precedence of using radical Islam to 
enact change, then it may be easier to justify participation in such a movement.  As such, 
future scholars may want to examine the relationship between historical inheritance and 
modern radial Islamist movements to determine if a correlation exists to help further the 
understanding of group formation.  However, the idea of exclusion presented in this 
thesis provides one possible explanation for how disenfranchised populations become 
available for exploitation by a leader.  Focusing future research in this direction will not 
only help us understand why radical Islamist groups form, but it will also provide factors 
that might be mitigated through proper application of U.S. policy in the region 
concerning the global war on terrorism.  
 
B. CONCLUSION 
The initial findings of this research suggest that U.S. counterterrorism policy in 
Sub-Saharan Africa needs to be refocused and refined.  While initiatives to prevent 
"failed states" target national level political structures, the case studies suggest that local 
level social and economic structures may be more critical to the emergence of radical 
Islamist movements.  As a result, some of these policy guidelines may have little or no 
effect on conditions that lead to radical Islamist group formation in Africa.  The findings 
of this thesis suggest that U.S. counter terrorism policy should focus more on economic 
exclusion at the local level, and the inability of states and or informal networks to 
mitigate this phenomenon when it occurs.  If the variables are truly interactive, an 
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increase in state capacity at the local level (vice the national level promulgated by state 
failure researchers), or an increase in the amount of informal networks providing social 
services will soften the blow of economic exclusion to the point where there is no pool or 
potential recruits to be exploited. The fact that economic exclusion observed in these 
cases occurred at the sub-national level, suggests that preventative policies should be 
targeted to providing better assistance to urban areas of sub-Saharan Africa that are 
experiencing rapid urbanization that cannot be absorbed by the state.  At the same time, 
improving rural conditions by providing improved drinking water and housing might help 
mitigate the push factors that contribute to urbanization. It is possible that future studies 
might determine which cities in Africa are a priority for necessary support, and how the 
U.S. can directly intervene through USAID or other agencies to help improve sub-
national structural conditions without offending the host nation government.   
The following policies prescriptions follow from my findings.  First, increasing 
democracy is a goal that could help prevent terrorist group formation in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Though many of the countries in Africa meet the minimalist definition of 
democracy, patron-client networks remain a critical element in state-society relations, and 
exclusion from these networks remains a potential source of radicalism.  As the Nigeria 
case illustrated, the inability for new immigrants to obtain adequate work and housing 
due to their nonassociation with the prominent Sufi brotherhoods established a degree of 
economic exclusion that provided a pool of recruits for Marwa to exploit and radicalize.  
Additionally, with no other formalized social organizations to take in these 
disenfranchised workers (such as labor unions or political parties), a radical organization 
like the Maitatsine gained more members.  Therefore in the effort to increase democracy, 
as a first step, the U.S. should try to encourage all African states to legalize political 
parties, give them freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press. 
Many countries in Africa, while having political parties, do not provide them with the 
same degree of freedom as evidenced in Tanzania.  Even though the parties technically 





political parties exist, while having the additional freedoms of assembly and speech can 
break the justification of radical Islamists that a jihad is necessary to overthrow a 
tyrannical government.125 
Increasing state capacity is the second area where the U.S. should promote 
improvement within Africa, particularly at the local level of administration.  Progress in 
this area would mean ensuring the provision of social goods such as liberty, security, 
welfare, and justice by the government in power.126  The implementation of these 
political and civil freedoms would help eliminate the exploitable conditions of economic 
exclusion.  Achieving such results at the sub-national level is undoubtedly a more 
difficult task than the previous goal of increasing democracy.  However, it is clear from 
the case studies that had such goods been available in Nigeria, is seems unlikely a radical 
group could have formed in the absence of disenfranchised populations.  For example, if 
the government in Kano had the capacity to ensure the welfare of the new immigrants, 
even at a minimal level, Marwa certainly would not have had as many recruits to bring to 
his cause.  Additionally, if there was justice concerning equal opportunity hiring 
practices, it might have been easier for a non-Sufi to get a job, preventing economic 
exclusion based on religion.  The same can be said of formal hiring practices in Zanzibar 
City, which are dominated by ethnicity.  However enough relief existed through informal 
networks in Zanzibar City to absorb the economic shocks, when the government had no 
capacity to do so. 
Since the primary cause of a pool of recruits being generated for exploitation by 
radical Islamists is hypothesized to a result of economic exclusion, U.S. policy should 
focus on mitigating this factor first.  However, the idea of a free and fair democracy 
should not be neglected, as it is possible that political disenfranchisement might also lead 
to an available pool of radical Islamist recruits.  Therefore, a new policy should try to 
meet the following recommendations in priority order: 
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• Promote economic growth within Africa 
• Cancel all outstanding debts to give African countries a fresh start 
• Work with African governments to provide adequate tax incentives 
to lure foreign investors 
• Provide U.S. tax incentives for citizens who invest in Africa-based 
companies 
• Provide U.S. tax incentives for U.S. companies who provide 
capital improvements to African countries (such as building 
schools, computer centers, roadways, etc.) 
• Increase state capacity to deal with exogenous shocks.  Specifically work 
toward the following goals: 
• Increase sanitation, water, and housing within urban growth areas 
to provide quality of life. 
• Increase sanitation, water, housing, and educational opportunities 
within rural areas to mitigate the push/pull factors that lead to rural 
to urban migration 
• Support the formation of social organizations within urban areas to 
help soften the blow of new immigrants to urban areas  
• Increase democracy, good governance, and rule of law.  Specifically work 
toward the following goals:  
• Increase civil liberties in African countries by pressuring 
governments to privatize radio and print media through the linking 
of foreign aid 
• Increase political freedoms in African countries by pressuring 
governments to legalize multiple political parties and guarantee 
freedom of assembly 
• Provide monitors for all national elections, as well as local 
elections once a year to determine if free and fair elections are 
indeed being carried out 
• Continue to encourage decentralization of governments of Africa 
to the local level, but have them link national funding to good 
governance at the level, similar to the linking of foreign aid by the 
U.S. government to the national level government. 
The goals presented above are achievable within a decade if proper emphasis is 
given to their implementation.  Ideally, these goals would target the conditions that allow 
for economic exclusion to occur within urban areas, which are the breeding ground for 
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future terrorists.  The United States must confront terrorism in Africa directly, by 
addressing the issues that appear to have led to the formation of extremist groups in the 
past.  Vague policy goals addressing several issues that are unrelated to formation will 
only serve to divide funding to an area of the world that is already near the bottom of the 
U.S. priority list.  Given the limited number of resources available, it is critical to ensure 
the recommended policies are directed toward the countries that have the potential to 
become the true terrorist breeding grounds of the future. By taking a proactive policy 
toward eliminating economic exclusion at the sub-national level, the number of 
disenfranchised people should decrease, thereby denying a potential radical leader the 
resources he or she needs to build a radical Islamist group.  Therefore, it is imperative 
that scholars take the limited research presented here and expand upon it through further 
testing of the framework within an African context as well as expand upon the ways U.S. 
policy might be effective at the sub-national level.  As research increases and more 
effective policies are identified, it may truly be possible to win the war on terrorism in 

















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
51 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adeshida, Abayomi. “Police Arrests Ring Leader of 1984 Maitatsine Religious Riot.”                               
Vanguard (Nigeria), 1 April 2003. 
Akpan, Ntieyong U. The Struggle for Secession 1966-1970: A Personal Account of the 
Nigerian Civil War. London: Frank Cass, 1971.  
Ayubi, Nazih. “The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt.” International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 12, no. 4 (December 1980): 481-499. 
Babu, A.M.  “The 1964 Revolution: Lumpen or Vanguard?” in Zanzibar Under Colonial 
Rule, edited by Abdul Sheriff and Ed Ferguson, 220-248. Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 1991. 
Bader, Zinnat. “The Contradictions of Merchant Capital: 1840-1939.” In Zanzibar Under 
Colonial Rule, edited by Abdul Sheriff and Ed Ferguson, 163-187. Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1991,  
Bennett, Norman R. A History of the Arab State of Zanzibar. London: Methuen & Co., 
1978. 
Beyer, Lisa and David Van Biema. “Inside the Kingdom.” Time, 15 September 2003, 38. 
Burgess, Thomas. “Remembering Youth: Generation in Revolutionary Zanzibar.” Africa 
Today 46, no. 2 (1999): 29-50. 
________. “The Young Pioneers and the Rituals of Citizenship in Revolutionary 
Zanzibar,” Africa Today 51, no. 3 (2005): vi-xxiv. 
Chittick, Neville. “Kilwa and the Arab Settlement of the East African Coast.” Journal of 
African History 4, no. 2 (1963): 179-190. 
Cohen, Abner. Custom & Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba 
Towns. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. 
Congress, House. Committee on International Relations, Africa and the War on Global 
Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on 
International Relations. 107th Cong., 1st sess., 15 November 2001. 
Daniel, F. “Shehu dan Fodio,” Journal of the Royal African Society 25, no. 99 (April 
1926); 278-283. 
Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. Washington D.C.: Department 
of State Publication, April 2003. 
52 
Department of Treasury. Fact Sheet: Designations of Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Branches of Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, 11 March 2002. [Available 
Online]: http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02031104.htm [23 Oct 2003]. 
Depelchin, Jacques. “The Transition from Slavery 1873-1914.” In Zanzibar Under 
Colonial Rule, edited by Abdul Sheriff and Ed Ferguson, 11-35. Athens, OH: 
Ohio University Press, 1991. 
Dickinson, Daniel. “Tourism ‘Bypasses’ Zanzibar’s Locals,” BBC News Online, 17 
February 2004.  Available [Online]: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3493533.stm  [7 Jun 2005]. 
“Eleven Killed in Clash Between Police and Outlawed Sect.” Associated Press, 26 April 
1985. 
Ensminger, Jean. Making a Market: The Institutional Transformation of an African 
Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Entelis, John P. “Political Islam in the Maghreb” in Islam, Democracy, and the State in 
North Africa, edited by John P. Entelis, 43-74. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1997. 
Falola, Toyin. Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular 
Ideologies. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1998. 
Fandy, Mamoun. Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent. New York: Palgrave, 1999. 
Freedom House. Annual Survey of Freedom Country Scores 2005.  Available [Online]: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm  [20 Jun 2005]. 
Hickey, Raymond. “The 1982 Maitatsine Uprisings: A Note.” African Affairs 83, no. 331 
(April 1984): 251-256. 
Hiskett, M. “Kitab al-farq: A Work on the Habe Kingdoms Attributed to ‘Uthman dan 
Fodio.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London 23, no. 3 (1960): 558-579. 
Hiskett, Mervyn. The Development of Islam in West Africa. London: Longman, 1984. 
Ihonvbere, Julius O. and Timothy Shaw. Illusions of Power: Nigeria in Transition. 
Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1998. 
Kastfelt, Niels. “Rumours of Maitatsine: A Note on Political Culture in Northern 
Nigeria.” African Affairs 88, no. 350 (January 1989): 83-90. 
Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Trans. By Anthony F. Roberts, 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.  
53 
Keshodkar, Akbar. “The Politics of Localization: Controlling Movement in the Field.” 
Anthropology Matters Journal 6, no. 2 (2004). Available [Online]: 
http://www.anthropologymatters.com/journal/2004-2/index.html  [10 Jun 2005]. 
La Cour Madsen, Birgit. “Islands of Development: What Do Poor Women in Zanzibar 
Get Out of Tourism Liberalisation?” Report for Action Aid (27 September 2003).  
Available [Online]: http://www.actionaid.org.uk/540/press_release.html [12 Jun 
2005].   
Law, Robin “A West African Cavalry State: The Kingdom of Oyo.” The Journal of 
African History 16, no. 1 (1975): 1-15. 
Lewis, Peter M. “Islam, Protest, and Conflict in Nigeria.” Africa Notes 10. Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (December 2002).  Available [Online]: 
www.csis.org/africa/ANotes/ANotes0212.pdf [8 Dec 2003]. 
Lloyd, P.C. “The Ethnic Background to the Nigerian Crisis.” In Nigerian Politics and 
Military Rule, edited by S.K. Panter-Brick, 14-57. London: The Athlone Press, 
University of London, 1970. 
Lofchie, Michael F. Zanzibar: Background to Revolution. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1965. 
Loimeier, Roman. “Islamic Reform and Political Change: The Example of Abubakar 
Gumi and the Yan Izala Movement in Northern Nigeria.” In Islamic Reform and 
Political Change, edited by Eva Evers Rosander and David Westerlund, 286-307. 
London: Hurst & Company, 1997. 
Majtenyl, Cathy. “Police Investigate Explosion in Zanzibar,” VOA News, 25 April 2005. 
Available [Online]:  http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-04-25-voa42.cfm  
[20 Jun 2005].  
Manning, Patrick. “Slaves, Palm Oil, and Political Power on the West African Coast.” 
African Historical Studies 2, no. 2 (1969): 279-288. 
Ministry of Health. Kano State 1999. Available [Online]: 
http://www.kanoOnline.com/population.html  [8 Jun 2005]. 
“New Conflict Between Police and Religious Group in Nigeria.” Xinhua General 
Overseas News Service, 19 February 1987. 
“New Sharia Law in Nigeria.” BBC News Online, 28 Apr 2004. 
Nichols, C.S. The Swahili Coast: Politics, Diplomacy, and Trade on the East African 
Littoral 1798-1856.  New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971. 
54 
Nicolas, G. “Guerre Sainte à Kano,” Politique Africaine no. 4 (December 1981). 
Available [Online]: http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/004_SOM.HTM 
[8 Nov 2003]. 
“Nigeria Fanatics Attack Police.” Toronto Star, 28 May 1998. 
Northrup, David. “The Growth of Trade Among the Igbo Before 1800,” The Journal of 
African History 13, no. 2 (1972): 217-236. 
Obasanjo, Olusegun. My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1960. 
London: Morrison & Gibb, 1980. 
Okello, John. Revolution in Zanzibar. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967. 
Osaghae, Eghosa E. Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence. London: Hurst & Co., 
1998. 
Oyewole, A. Historical Dictionary of Nigeria. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1987.  
Palmer, H.R. “An Early Fulani Conception of Jihad.” Journal of the Royal African 
Society 13, no. 52 (July 1914): 407-414. 
Pearson, M.N. “The Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.” In The History of Islam in Africa,  
edited by Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels, 37-62. Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 2000. 
Pelletiere, Stephen. A Theory of Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into the Origin and 
Development of the Movement. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College, 1995. 
Pennock, J. Ronald. “Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods.” 
World Politics 18, no. 3 (1966): 415-434. 
“Police to Grill Women Beating Muslim Clerics.” The Guardian, 18 November 2002. 
Pouwells, Randall L. “The East African Coast, c. 790 to 1900 C.E.” In The History of 
Islam in Africa, edited by Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwells, 251-272. 
Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000. 
________. “The Medieval Foundations of East African Islam.” The International Journal 
of African Historical Studies 11, no. 2 (1978): 201-226. 
Reno, William. “Old Brigades, Money Bags, New Breeds, and the Ironies of Reform in 
Nigeria.” Canadian Journal of African Studies 27, no. 1 (1993): 66-87. 
Report of Tribunal of Inquiry on Kano Disturbances. Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 
1981. 
55 
Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan: Six Months 
Progress Report January – June 2004. Available [Online]: 
http://www.zprp.org/0reports.htm  [7 Jun 2005]. 
Ricks, Thomas M. “Persian Gulf Seafaring and East Africa: Ninth-Twelfth Centuries.” 
African Historical Studies 3, no. 2 (1970): 339-357. 
 Rotberg, Robert I. “Failed States, Collapsed States, and Weak States: Causes and 
Indicators.” In State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, edited by 
Robert I. Rotberg, 1-28. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. 
________. “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure.” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 
3 (Summer 2002): 85-96. 
Saleh, Ally. “Zanzibar Gang Targets Women,” BBC News Online, 31 October 2003. 
Available [Online]: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3231717.stm [3 Jun 
2005].   
Sheriff Abdul. Slaves, Spices, & Ivory in Zanzibar: Integration of an East African 
Commercial Empire into the World Economy, 1770-1873. Athens, OH: Ohio 
University Press, 1987. 
Sklar, Richard L. Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 
Smith, Brian. “Federal-State Relations in Nigeria,” African Affairs 80, no. 320 (1981): 
355-378. 
Tambo, David C. “The Sokoto Caliphate Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century.” The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies 9, no. 2 (1976): 187-217. 
Tarimo, Judica. “Govt Bans CUF ‘Military’ Training.” The Guardian, 2 April 2004.  
Available [Online]:  www.ippmedia.com [8 Jun 2005].   
Taylor, Max and John Horgan, “The Psychological and Behavioural Bases of Islamic 
Fundamentalism.” Terrorsm and Political Violence 13, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 37-
71. 
Tessler, Mark. “The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements.” In Islam, 
Democracy, and the State in North Africa, edited by John P. Entelis. 93-126. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997. 
Tomlinson, Chris. “Radical ‘Tabligh’ Recruit Fighters,” Washington Times, 29 April 
2004.  Available [Online]: http://washingtontimes.com/world/20040428-092454-
8928r.htm  [8 Jun 2005]. 
Trimingham, J. Spencer. A History of Islam in West Africa. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1962. 
56 
Trimingham, J. Spencer. Islam in East Africa. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. 
Umar, Muhammad S. “Education and Islamic Trends in Northern Nigeria: 1970s-1990s.” 
Africa Today 48, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 126-150. 
“U.S. Issues Zanzibar Terror Warning,” BBC News Online, 11 January 2003.  Available 
[Online]: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2648017.stm [3 Jun 2005]. 
Waldman, Marilyn Robinson. “The Fulani Jihad: A Reassessment.” The Journal of 
African History 6, no. 3 (1965): 333-355. 
Watts, Michael and Paul Lubek. “The Popular Classes and the Oil Boom: A Political 
Economy of Rural and Urban Poverty.” In The Political Economy of Nigeria, 
edited by I. William Zartman, 105-145. New York: Praeger, 1983. 
White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, April 2003. 
________. The National Security Strategy of the United States. September 2002. 
Wilkenson, J.C. “Oman and East Africa: New Light on Early Kilwan History from the 
Omani Sources.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 15, no. 2 
(1981): 272-305. 
Zanzibar Hit as Tourists Stay Away.” BBC News Online, 2 May 2003. Available 
[Online]: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2995965.stm [3 Jun 2005].  
57 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir,Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. USAFA/DFH 
USAF Academy, Colorado 
 
4. USAFA/DFES 
USAF Academy, Colorado  
